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President Urges Plans to Lower Iran's Gasoline Consumption

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called for measures to reduce gasoline consumption and optimize fuel use, urging government bodies to lead efforts to conserve energy amid economic challenges. Addressing a cabinet meeting on Sunday evening, Pezeshkian said the administration is continuing efforts to increase gasoline production while distributing fuel in accordance with output levels. He expressed confidence that the Iranian people, as they had done in the past, would cooperate with the government and understand the circumstances facing the country. The president stressed, however, that conservation must begin with government institutions themselves. He also called for plans to reduce the use of government vehicles and the amount of fuel consumed by state institutions. The president instructed officials to devise measures to reduce the number of trips made by government vehicles and optimize their use. Pezeshkian referred to efforts by Iran’s enemies to exacerbate the country’s economic difficulties, as well as the problems that typically arise in the aftermath of any war, particularly the challenges Iran had faced regarding gasoline.

Govt. Weighs Plans to Curb Gasoline Imports

Petroleum Minister Mohsen Paknejad said the government is considering several plans to address the gap between gasoline production and consumption, but no decision has been finalized. Speaking to IRIB on Sunday, Paknejad said part of the gasoline supply shortfall is currently being covered through imports. “The government’s goal is to reduce gasoline imports to the minimum possible level,” he said. Paknejad said part of the country’s resources are being spent on gasoline imports and that, given economic constraints, continuing the current trend is not sustainable. He said several proposals have been put forward to manage the imbalance between gasoline production and consumption and are being reviewed by experts. “The decision-making process is continuing until these proposals reach the decision stage,” Paknejad said, adding that if a plan is finalized, the public will be informed of its details before any implementation begins. Addressing reports about possible new gasoline prices, Paknejad said some of the figures circulating in the media are merely speculation and should not be considered official until a final decision is made. - Kayhan

25/08/2026

Iran Sells Confiscated US Oil to Aid Butterfly Patients

Iran has sold a seized U.S. oil cargo and will distribute the proceeds to 771 Iranian patients suffering from Epidermolysis Bullosa (EB), a rare genetic condition that causes the skin to become fragile and blister easily, following a court ruling that found U.S. sanctions responsible for restricting their access to essential medical supplies. Judge Majid Husseinzadeh, head of Branch 55 of the Tehran Legal Court of International Relations, announced Monday that the oil tanker was seized in the Persian Gulf in 2023 and its cargo sold after the court established it belonged to the U.S. government. The proceeds, estimated at approximately US$36 to US$37 million, have been deposited into a Judiciary account and are now being distributed to the plaintiffs. The case was filed by 771 EB patients, supported by EB Home, the only nationwide non-governmental organization representing people with the condition.

The plaintiffs sought compensation for material, moral and punitive damages resulting from what they described as unlawful U.S. sanctions that prevented access to specialized medical dressings and pharmaceuticals. Judge Husseinzadeh said the court collected extensive documentation from domestic and international bodies, forensic medicine authorities and non-governmental organizations to establish the direct role of U.S. sanctions in restricting patients’ access to medicine. “During the proceedings, it was established that the U.S. Treasury Department, through intimidation and the imposition of severe sanctions, had directly or by blocking financial transactions, prevented pharmaceutical companies and manufacturers of specialized dressings from sending medicines and medical supplies to Iran,” he said. “This action constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental right to access healthcare and medical treatment, which is recognized as one of the basic principles of human rights,” the judge emphasized.

The court issued a detailed ruling exceeding 100 pages, finding the U.S. government’s actions “unlawful and inhumane” and ordering compensation for the resulting damages. In July 2024, the same court ruled that the United States must pay US$6.785 billion in damages to Iranian EB patients and their families over the impact of sanctions. That ruling followed a lawsuit filed by 295 EB patients and relatives, who argued that sanctions had blocked vital wound care products and medications. The announcement comes as the Trump administration prepares to unveil what it has described as the “toughest sanctions in history” against Tehran. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has called the impending measures “the single greatest financial offensive ever marshaled against an adversary” in an op-ed published Sunday.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly boasted about the new sanctions, threatening Iran with what he has termed “economic warfare.” The terrorist American administration has described the upcoming announcement as an “economic D-Day,” signaling an unprecedented escalation of economic pressure on the Islamic Republic. Bessent was expected to announce the new measures at a press conference on Monday, targeting Iran’s trading partners including China. Iranian officials have condemned the new sanctions threats as “economic terrorism” and “crimes against humanity.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei addressed the issue during his weekly press conference on Monday, describing the U.S. campaign as a form of collective punishment against the Iranian people. “America, which was supposed to come to the aid of Iranians, uses every tool to punish Iranians for one reason only: their insistence on their national sovereignty, independence and dignity,” Baghaei said. “We have given and continue to give the necessary warnings because any complicity with America in advancing its aggressive actions against Iran will certainly have consequences,” he added. He also referenced the ongoing naval blockade of Iran, describing it as a “manifestation of aggressive action” and warning that “escalation of this situation will have its own consequences. We are not helpless in the face of such aggressive actions.”

Although Washington and its Western allies claim humanitarian goods are exempt from sanctions, tens of thousands of patients in Iran have died or developed critical ailments over the years due to the unavailability of essential drugs. Swedish company Mölnlycke, a major producer of medical bandages and healing dressings for EB patients worldwide, stopped transactions with Iran soon after sanctions were reinstated in 2018. The court found that over approximately eight months after sanctions were reimposed, Iranian EB patients ran out of medicine and ointment to heal their deep skin wounds, resulting in about 20 deaths and irreparable physical injuries for many survivors. Currently, approximately 1,250 EB patients have been identified in Iran, with EB Home being the only registered organization dedicated to their care. - Kayhan

25/08/2026

Govt. Weighs Plans to Curb Iran's Gasoline Imports

Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said the government is considering several plans to address the gap between gasoline production and consumption, but no decision has been finalized. Speaking to IRIB on Sunday, Paknejad said part of the gasoline supply shortfall is currently being covered through imports.

“The government’s goal is to reduce gasoline imports to the minimum possible level,” he said. Paknejad said part of the country’s resources are being spent on gasoline imports and that, given economic constraints, continuing the current trend is not sustainable.

He said several proposals have been put forward to manage the imbalance between gasoline production and consumption and are being reviewed by experts. “The decision-making process is continuing until these proposals reach the decision stage,” Paknejad said, adding that if a plan is finalized, the public will be informed of its details before any implementation begins.

Addressing reports about possible new gasoline prices, Paknejad said some of the figures circulating in the media are merely speculation and should not be considered official until a final decision is made. - Shana

25/08/2026

Emirati-Iraqi Business Council Discusses Investment Opportunities

Investment opportunities in the Iraqi market and ways to attract Emirati companies were discussed at a meeting between Iraq's Ministry of Trade and the Emirati-Iraqi Business Council.

According to the Ministry of Trade, Dr. Malik Khalaf al-Durei'i, Director General of the Private Sector Development Department, visited the council's headquarters and attended its periodic meeting.

Topics included ways to create a more business-friendly environment for UAE companies and mechanisms to remove obstacles facing the council's investment activities.

25/08/2026

US Threatens Countries Doing Business with Iran

President Donald Trump's administration on Monday warned countries to cut their business ties with Iran or face secondary sanctions as part of what it billed as an "economic D-Day," but the Treasury Department stopped short of actually imposing penalties. As the war with Iran nears its six-month mark, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the U.S. was ‌launching an "economic onslaught" against Iran's financial connections around the globe.

But he declined to say what specific countries would be targeted, or when those penalties would take effect. The Treasury Department announced new sanctions on 60 individuals, entities and vessels but that list did not include any of the Chinese financial institutions suspected of facilitating Iran's oil trade. "Why would I want to blow up the global financial system? We believe that it is important to level set and give people a cure period, but they should know that that will move very quickly and that we are serious," Bessent told a press conference. China has for several years been the biggest buyer of Iranian oil, and Washington has intensified its efforts to clamp down on Chinese purchases, but has so far stopped short of targeting Chinese banks with sanctions. Asked whether the ⁠Treasury was now prepared to move against a Chinese bank, he said that no country was out of the reach of U.S. sanctions, adding: "If they facilitate transactions and are part of the ecosystem that turns Iranian oil into money, into repression, they will be targeted."

With Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping scheduled to meet in Washington in late September, new sanctions on Chinese banks could sour prospects for extending a deal struck last November to keep Chinese rare earths flowing and cap U.S. tariffs. Tuesday's action targeted other businesses in China, the UAE, Singapore and several other countries, including a cooking-oil refinery in France. Bessent said the U.S. was expanding the scope of commercial activities that could be subject to secondary sanctions in five sectors of the Iranian economy: digital assets, gold, technology, aviation and shipping. He said he previewed a "major announcement" of sanctions on a financial institution by the end of the week but a Treasury spokesperson did not respond to a request for more information.

LONG CAMPAIGN
Daniel Fried, a former U.S. State Department sanctions coordinator who is now with the Atlantic Council, said that the announcement "did not live up to the hype," but economic pressure is better than restarting military conflict. The pressure campaign on Iran will take time to work and patience and possibly require some concessions on the part of the Trump administration to secure cooperation, he ‌said.

"You're going to ⁠have to get the GCC countries to agree, and you're going to have to listen to what they want, and be steady," Fried said. Trump's war with Iran, which has pushed energy prices higher worldwide, is about to hit its six-month mark. While heavy fighting has subsided, diplomatic efforts to end the war have stalled and oil and raw material shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, keeping energy prices elevated. Trump's approval rating has fallen to a low point, with just 33% of Americans in the latest Reuters/Ipsos poll approving of his performance. He says the economic costs are necessary to ensure Iran does not have a nuclear weapon.

DECADES OF SANCTIONS
The U.S. has maintained sanctions against Iran for decades, ⁠most of which have been aimed at curtailing the country's oil revenues, acquisition of weapons components and cutting off funding for business enterprises controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a dominant force in the Iranian economy. The sanctions bar designated entities from the dollar-based financial system, but Iran has been successful in quickly standing up new front companies, other entities and vessel registrations to evade the sanctions. The Treasury Department has also recently sanctioned independent Chinese "teapot" refineries for buying Iranian oil, and expanded ⁠sanctions on the "shadow fleet" of tankers transporting Iranian oil. Tehran has managed to weather decades of U.S. sanctions but the naval blockade that the U.S. imposed has inflicted severe economic damage on the country. That already curbed Chinese offers to purchase Iranian crude, Reuters reported on Friday, which may lessen the impact of secondary sanctions on China.

Earlier this month, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the United States could maintain the naval blockade indefinitely, which could keep ⁠oil prices elevated, potentially stirring U.S. voter anger ahead of congressional elections in November.

Treasury Department data shows the U.S. has imposed Iran-related sanctions on more than 1,000 people, vessels and aircraft since Trump began his second term in 2025. Recent measures have targeted Iran's shadow oil fleet, shipping insurers, weapons-procurement network, and digital exchanges, freezing an estimated US$500 billion in Iran-linked cryptocurrency. Bessent singled out Iran's Bank Melli, which continues to operate branches in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. "Every branch of Bank Melli must be shuttered and dark," he said.

Today (24 August), at President Trump’s direction, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has begun Operation Economic Outcast: an unprecedented, whole-of-government, economic campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its enablers.

“In the Second World War, D-Day marked the historic beginning of a campaign with our allies to target and drive the enemy from its positions, including those in third countries. Today, in that same spirit, we are launching an economic onslaught against Iran’s financial connections around the globe. Our objective is to sever every economic lifeline that sustains this tyrannical regime until Tehran stands alone,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “President Trump has taken action that his predecessors have long deferred. Under his leadership, America is no longer managing the Iranian threat. We are ending it. Those who stand with the United States will reap the rewards of our partnership. Those who tether themselves to Tehran should expect to share in the isolation of a withering regime.”

Operation Economic Outcast Targets Iran’s Lifelines
Operation Economic Outcast will sever the economic lifelines that sustain the Iranian regime and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These actions today mark the beginning of a sustained and systematic campaign to close every financial resource that supports the leading state sponsor of terror.

Treasury has mapped the networks, facilitators, and financial channels that Iran uses to smuggle oil, evade sanctions, and fund terror. Working with our partners across the U.S. government, Treasury will be uncompromising in targeting any source of the regime’s illicit revenue.

The Iranian regime faces a clear choice: severe global isolation or a path to reintegration with the global economy.

U.S. Government Presses Countries for Immediate Action, Expands Secondary Sanctions Risk for Iran-Related Activity
Teams from the Departments of Treasury, State, and War are engaging counterparts around the world to make clear that the United States expects immediate action. Every country will be given a defined timeline to shut down the Iran-related activity we have identified. If they fail to act, Treasury will act.

Any entity that facilitates money laundering or sanctions evasion on behalf of Iran risks being cut off from the U.S. financial system. Today’s announcement also expands secondary sanctions exposure for those who continue doing business with the Iranian regime and will accelerate the pace of U.S. enforcement.

Today’s actions are as follows:

Treasury is expanding the categories of Iran-related conduct that may be subject to secondary sanctions in the future, making it easier to take action against those facilitating the regime. Treasury has issued determinations against five critical sectors––digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping––that the Iranian regime uses to try to prop up its failing economy.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nearly 60 entities, individuals, and vessels in multiple jurisdictions that enable the Iranian regime’s recklessness, including illicit nuclear and missile technology procurement, cyber operations, and oil‑revenue generation networks.
OFAC suspended several general licenses that previously authorized certain remittance payments to Iran and Iranian access to the U.S. cultural and academic system.
OFAC issued additional guidance on the sanctions risks of bowing to Iranian demands related to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
OFAC SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDING SANCTIONS RISK TO KEY SECTORS
Treasury is significantly expanding sanctions risk for those who continue to choose to do business with Iran. It is well documented that the Iranian regime has increasingly leveraged a variety of means to sustain itself and continue its campaign of destabilization and terrorism in the region and around the world. This includes the regime’s attempts to exploit digital assets, acquire critical technology, and obfuscate its shipping trade, leveraging third-country jurisdictions as critical enablers in these schemes. This is unacceptable.

Today, OFAC is issuing an unprecedented five sectoral sanctions determinations pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets certain sectors of the Iranian economy, further strengthening and significantly expanding Treasury’s ability to impose sanctions on any foreign person operating in or providing services in support of these sectors.

With today’s action, OFAC can now sanction any person, regardless of where they are located, that operates in the following sectors of the Iranian economy:

Digital Assets: The Iranian regime increasingly turns to cryptocurrency as a tool of choice for sanctions evasion, supporting transactions linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian regime insiders.
Technology: Iran is also attempting to access advanced technologies and integrate these technologies into its domestically manufactured weapons programs.
Gold: As Iran’s formal financial sector collapses, the regime is increasingly attempting to stabilize the rial with gold to hedge against rampant inflation.
Aviation: Iran continues to use its supposed “commercial” airlines, many of which are controlled by the regime and the IRGC, to ferry fighters, ship weapons and sensitive technologies, and move gold and hard cash to its proxies.
Shipping: Iran’s national shipping line regularly transports sensitive weapons components and missile precursors, while Iran’s national tanker service illicitly ships oil for the regime and its military services.
These determinations build on similar determinations targeting Iran’s financial and petroleum and petrochemical sectors, critical components of Iran’s economy which have seen significant declines in revenue and are rife with corruption and mismanagement.

OFAC Targets Nearly 60 Iran-Linked Entities, Individuals, and Vessels Across Nuclear, Missile, Cyber, and Oil Networks
Today’s designations also intensify pressure on the networks that sustain the regime’s malign activities and fund its attacks across the region. OFAC is taking these actions pursuant to the following authorities: E.O. 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery; E.O. 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757 and as further amended by E.O. 14144 and 14306 (“E.O. 13694, as further amended”), which targets malicious cyber-enabled activities; E.O. 13902; and E.O. 13224, as amended, a counterterrorism authority. The U.S. Department of State designated Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program.

Today’s actions target:

A procurement scheme supporting MODAFL subordinates’ procurement of proliferation-sensitive technology and equipment for ballistic missile development and nuclear research;
A malicious cyber group directed by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) that is responsible for extensive compromises of U.S. critical infrastructure and financially motivated cyber theft; and
A network of brokers, companies, and shadow fleet vessels operating across the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Switzerland, Europe, and other regions to transport Iranian oil and channel revenue to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC‑QF) and other regime elements.
Treasury is also designating several international companies that operate within Iran’s petroleum sector and enable the deceptive movement and sale of Iranian crude and petroleum products.

This MOIS action was taken in close coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which on August 18, 2026 announced the unsealing of a superseding indictment charging 17 Iranian cyber actors, four of whom are being designated today. The MOIS is designated pursuant to multiple authorities––including E.O. 13694, as further amended, E.O. 13224, and E.O. 13553––for cyber activity that threatens the national security of the United States; support to multiple terrorist groups; and for being responsible for, or complicit in, the commission of serious human rights abuses against the Iranian people. On September 18, 2023, OFAC designated the MOIS pursuant to E.O. 14078 for its involvement in the wrongful detention of U.S. citizens, including the abduction, detention, and probable murder of former FBI Special Agent Robert A. “Bob” Levinson, with the authorization of senior Iranian government officials.

Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information on any person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, engages in certain malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The public is encouraged to report malicious cyber and other illegal online activity to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).

Concurrently, the Department of State is designating seven members of Iran’s defense leadership and two Iranian entities involved in enabling Iranian military strikes against U.S. forces and partners across the region. The Department of State’s action also targeted actors involved in the trade of Iranian oil, petroleum products, and petrochemical products.

OFAC Disrupts Iran’s Global Procurement Network for Sensitive Nuclear and Missile Technology
As part of the MODAFL action, OFAC is targeting a network of more than 20 entities and individuals spanning the Middle East and East Asia that financially and logistically support the Iranian regime’s procurement of critical technology for nuclear research and missile development. The persons sanctioned today facilitated the acquisition of proliferation-sensitive equipment for U.S., United Nations (UN), and European Union (EU)-sanctioned Malek Ashtar University of Technology (Malek Ashtar), as well as other end-users subordinate to Iran’s MODAFL. The network has enabled Iran to obtain highly sensitive dual‑use technology through a sprawling system of front companies, covert financial channels, and logistics intermediaries across East Asia, allowing sanctioned Iranian military institutions to disguise end users and evade global export controls.

Hong Kong-based Sweet Ocean Industrial Limited (Sweet Ocean) has served as an intermediary for the procurement of sensitive goods, including laser optics equipment, destined for Iran’s Malek Ashtar. China-based Li Na, on behalf of Sweet Ocean, has coordinated the procurement of sensitive goods for Malek Ashtar and other Iranian customers. China-based Tian Jianbai coordinated the procurement of an accelerometer––a navigation and guidance instrument with applications in missiles and aircraft––on behalf of Sweet Ocean. China-based Zhang Limei has repeatedly served as the point of contact for billing and deliveries to Sweet Ocean.

Li Na serves as the director and sole shareholder of Hong Kong-based RPT Technology Limited (RPT Technology), while Tian Jianbai serves as the director and 50‑percent shareholder of China-based Shenzhen Sweet Ocean Technology Limited (Shenzhen Sweet Ocean), which specializes in test instrument products, lab devices, optical and electronic products, and the provision of purchase and sourcing agent services specifically for Iran. Hong Kong-based Tiany Technology Limited (Tiany Technology) has facilitated Shenzhen Sweet Ocean’s procurement of sensitive products, including actuators, for Iranian end‑users. Hong Kong-based MT Trading and Logistics HK Limited (MT Trading) has served as an intermediary for Shenzhen Sweet Ocean in its efforts to procure sensitive U.S.‑origin lab equipment for Iranian end-users.

Sweet Ocean is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Malek Ashtar.

Li Na and Tian Jianbai are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sweet Ocean.

Zhang Limei is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Sweet Ocean.

RPT Technology is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Li Na.

Shenzhen Sweet Ocean is being designated for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tian Jianbai.

Tiany Technology and MT Trading are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Shenzhen Sweet Ocean.

Hong Kong-based companies Feili Co Limited, Minvur Limited, Feisu Limited, and Guska Co Limited have each transferred tens of thousands of dollars to Sweet Ocean and its network in furtherance of procurements for multiple Iranian end-users. Feili Co Limited, Minvur Limited, and Feisu Limited also serve as front companies that facilitate payments for Iran’s clandestine “shadow banking” networks, including for OFAC-sanctioned Iranian exchanges Seyyed Mohammad Mosanna’i Najibi And Partners Company (Sadaf Exchange) and Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company (Amin Exchange). Guska Co Limited operates within Sadaf Exchange’s financial network. On June 25, 2024, OFAC designated Sadaf Exchange pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, MODAFL. On May 19, 2026, OFAC designated Amin Exchange pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.

Malaysia-based Vast Mart SDN BHD (Vast Mart) and Hong Kong-based HK Jiatai Technology Limited (HK Jiatai) have transferred funds to Sweet Ocean on multiple occasions. Hong Kong-based DEC Photonics Limited (DEC Photonics) has repeatedly transferred funds to Shenzhen Sweet Ocean.

Feili Co Limited, Minvur Limited, Feisu Limited, and Guska Co Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.

Vast Mart and HK Jiatai are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Sweet Ocean.

DEC Photonics is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Shenzhen Sweet Ocean.

Iran-based logistics firm Noavaran Axis Private Joint Stock Company (also known as BRE Line) has facilitated shipments to Iran’s Organization of Defensive Research and Innovation (SPND), which is subordinate to MODAFL. SPND is a Tehran-based entity, established in 2011, that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development. The U.S. Department of State designated SPND pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2014 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions or their means of delivery.

Iran-based Mohammad Hossein Aslani Moghaddam (Aslani Moghaddam) serves as the managing director of BRE Line, and China-based Shenzhen Huamei Lianyun International Logistics Co Ltd (Shenzhen Huamei) is BRE Line’s designated service provider in China. Hong Kong-based BRE International Logistics Corporation HK Limited (BRE HK) is BRE Line’s “branch” in Hong Kong, and BRE Line’s managing director, Aslani Moghaddam, is a 50-percent owner of BRE HK. China-based Qiu Xingyu is the registered director of BRE HK. Qiu Xingyu is also the majority owner of China-based Shenzhen Bositong Logistics Co Ltd (Shenzhen Bositong), and the ultimate beneficial owner and supervisor of Bositong Supply Chain Shenzhen Co Ltd (Bositong Supply Chain).

BRE Line is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, MODAFL.

Aslani Moghaddam is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, BRE Line.

Shenzhen Huamei is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, BRE Line.

BRE HK is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, BRE Line.

Qiu Xingyu is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, BRE HK. Shenzhen Bositong and Bositong Supply Chain are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Qiu Xingyu.

Treasury Targets Iranian Cyber Actors Behind Critical Infrastructure Intrusions and Digital Asset Theft
The MOIS directs several networks of cyber threat actors involved in cyber espionage in support of Iran’s political goals, which include harming American civilians.

Since at least summer 2023, Mojtaba Ghal’eh-Kuhi and Behzad Mesri have led a group of Iranian malicious cyber actors that includes Keyvan Fayyaz Ghareh Blagh, Saber Shahbazi Balujeh, Mohammad Reza Kadkhoda’i, and Arman Kahzadian. This group frequently conducts computer network exploitations on behalf, or for the benefit, of Iran’s MOIS.

On March 23, 2018, OFAC designated Behzad Mesri pursuant to E.O. 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757, for his role in the targeting and attempted extortion of a U.S. media and entertainment company. Additionally, on February 13, 2019, OFAC designated Behzad Mesri pursuant to E.O. 13606 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the OFAC-designated Net Peygard Samavat Company.

Keyvan Fayyaz Ghareh Blagh, Saber Shahbazi Balujeh, and Mohammad Reza Kadkhoda’i conduct the majority of this group’s network compromise activity. Since at least late 2023, these three individuals have successfully compromised and exfiltrated data from multiple U.S. companies in various critical infrastructure sectors, including energy companies, defense contractors, healthcare institutions, information technology companies, and financial institutions. Additionally, in summer 2024, they compromised multiple local, state, and federal government offices across the United States.

The members of this group are also heavily motivated by personal enrichment and greed, leading some members to prioritize their own profits over operations that benefit the MOIS. This has driven some of the group to target Iranian companies. In spring 2025, Mojtaba Ghal’eh-Kuhi and Saber Shahbazi Balujeh compromised and exfiltrated data from an Iranian telecommunications company.

Additionally, Arman Kahzadian has focused on digital asset heists. In summer 2023, Arman Kahzadian illicitly gained control of a wallet that held over $30,000 worth of Bitcoin.

Keyvan Fayyaz Ghareh Blagh, Saber Shahbazi Balujeh, Mohammad Reza Kadkhoda’i, and Mojtaba Ghal’eh-Kuhi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13694, as further amended, for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States that are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States and that have the purpose of or involve harming, or otherwise compromising the provision of services by, a computer or network of computers that support one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector.

Arman Kahzadian is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13694, as further amended, for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, the receipt or use for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain, or by a commercial entity, outside the United States of funds or economic resources, intellectual property, proprietary or business confidential information, personal identifiers, or financial information misappropriated through cyber-enabled means, knowing they have been misappropriated, where the misappropriation of such funds or economic resources, intellectual property, proprietary or business confidential information, personal identifiers, or financial information is reasonably likely to result in, or has materially contributed to, a threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States.

Treasury Targets Iran’s Shadow Fleet Shipping Network and Oil Revenue Facilitators
Sanctioned Iranian actors, to include those associated with its armed forces, rely on a vast network of shipping facilitators in multiple jurisdictions to enable the transportation and delivery of Iranian crude oil to markets in East Asia, to include vessel brokers, bunkering service providers, and financial intermediaries.

UAE-based Syrian national Mohammad Ahmed Suhil Fattouh (Fattouh), also known as “Captain Hamzah,” has for years served as a broker for shadow fleet vessels on behalf of multiple sanctioned parties, including the IRGC-QF-associated Al-Qatirji Company, Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and the oil sales arm of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company. Fattouh operates the Dubai-based company Amdeh Ship Management and Operation Co. L.L.C, through which he conducts his operations.

Mohammad Ahmed Suhil Fattouh is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, NIOC. Amdeh Ship Management and Operation Co. L.L.C is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Mohammad Ahmed Suhil Fattouh.

Like Fattouh, UAE-based Ukrainian national Ivan Obukhov (Obukhov) has for years served as a broker for Iranian shadow fleet vessels. Obukhov has facilitated Iranian oil shipments for the Iranian military and its proxies. Since 2023, Obukhov has processed over 100 million dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency payments to facilitate oil sales on behalf of the IRGC-QF. In coordination with Fattouh, Obukhov has also purchased vessels later used for sanctions evasion activities. Obukhov serves as the owner and general manager of UAE-based Foscom FZE, which he purchased in 2022.

Ivan Obukhov is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. Foscom FZE is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or indirectly, Ivan Obukhov.

Singapore-based Azure Shipping PTE. LTD. (Azure Shipping) has worked with the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) to facilitate ship-to-ship services to U.S. sanctioned vessels. Singapore-based Mansoor Tayabbhai Gandhi (Gandhi) is the previous owner of Azure Shipping and is the current owner of Trans Arctic Global Marine Services Pte. Ltd, which was designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. Gandhi is the owner of Singapore-based Arc Chartering Pte. Ltd. and Hong Kong-based Sky Oil and Gas Asia Limited.

Azure Shipping PTE. LTD. and Mansoor Tayabbhai Gandhi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. Arc Chartering Pte. Ltd. and Sky Oil and Gas Asia Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mansoor Tayabbhai Gandhi.

Since at least 2023, Hong Kong-based Shipoil Limited and its sister companies, Dubai-based Shipoil FZCO and Ship Fuels and Trade DMCC—operated by Greek nationals Almpertos “Alberto” Tsoris and Georgios “George” Tsoris—coordinated with sanctioned Iranian actors, including Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Commercial Company (PGPICC), Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd., NITC, and the network of Iranian oil shipping magnate Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Shamkhani), to provide bunkering services to vessels carrying Iranian crude oil and other petroleum products. For example, in 2026, Alberto Tsoris coordinated with NITC and the Shamkhani network via Shipoil FZCO and Ship Fuels and Trade DMCC to provide bunkering to the sanctioned oil tanker MEDNA (IMO: 9281683), formerly known as the ANTHEA and SIRI, a vessel which has carried crude oil for Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff.

Similarly, George Tsoris used Shipoil FZCO and Ship Fuels and Trade DMCC to provide vessel bunkering services to a mix of subsidiaries and front companies for the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). In 2026, UAE-based Unique Oasis Shipping Services LLC and Target Horizon Shipping LLC collaborated with Shipoil Limited and Ship Fuels and Trade DMCC to provide hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of bunkering services to an IRISL-linked vessel. In mid-2026, George Tsoris provided bunkering services to the sanctioned IRISL vessel BEHTA in coordination with IRISL subsidiary, UAE-based Good Luck Shipping LLC, and Unique Oasis Shipping Services LLC.

Shipoil Limited, Shipoil FZCO, and Ship Fuels and Trade DMCC operate within the same corporate network, share company leadership, and transfer funds between themselves. Shipoil Limited has transferred millions of dollars to Shipoil FZCO.

Almpertos Tsoris, Shipoil FZCO, and Ship Fuels and Trade DMCC are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. Shipoil Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Shipoil FZCO.

Georgios Tsoris, Good Luck Shipping LLC, Unique Oasis Shipping Services LLC, and Target Horizon Shipping LLC are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, IRISL.

Today’s action reflects OFAC’s ongoing close collaboration with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

OFAC Sanctions Shamkhani-Linked Commodities Trader and Global Subsidiaries
Singapore-based commodities trader Wellbred Capital PTE. LTD. and its subsidiaries,

UAE-based Wellbred Trading FZCO and Switzerland-based Wellbred Trading SA, collectively form a commodities trading business specializing in oil, naphtha, liquified petroleum gas, and other petrochemicals—all products commonly transported by the network of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Shamkhani). Shamkhani built Wellbred as a company outside the network’s Iranian business, though Shamkhani is ultimately responsible for Wellbred’s operations.

Wellbred Trading SA, as part of its efforts to appear as a legitimate company, has sought out strategic investments in Europe in the field of alternative energy. In 2024, Wellbred Trading SA purchased France-based cooking oil refinery La Nivernaise de Raffinage SAS.

Wellbred Capital PTE. LTD. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. Wellbred Trading FZCO and Wellbred Trading SA are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Wellbred Capital PTE. LTD. La Nivernaise de Raffinage SAS is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Wellbred Trading SA.

Treasury Targets Shadow Fleet Vessels Moving Millions of Barrels of Iranian Oil and Petroleum Products
Treasury is also taking action today against multiple shadow fleet vessels responsible for the unauthorized transport of millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products. Iran’s shadow fleet provides an essential lifeline to the Iranian regime, which relies on the sale of oil and other petroleum products to provide vital revenue to fund its military, among other necessities.

Botswana-flagged liquified petroleum gas (LPG) tanker SIFRA (IMO 9185346), owned by Marshall Islands-registered Sifra Shipping Company, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian LPG and ethylene since 2025, for reexport to third countries.
Cameroon-flagged LPG tanker G SILVER (IMO 9139696), owned by Hong Kong-registered Vienna Shipping Co., Limited, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian petroleum products to Southeast Asia, including Bangladesh, in 2026, for onward shipment to third countries.
Vanuatu-flagged crude oil tanker QUANTUM HOPE (IMO 9233650), owned by Hong Kong-registered Riqueza Group Ltd, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil to China since early 2026.
Gambia-flagged crude oil tanker VOYAGE ELITE (IMO 9286138), owned, operated, and managed by China-based Lilimoon Navigation Inc, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil to China since 2026.
Gambia-flagged TELA (IMO 9189110), owned, operated, and managed by United Kingdom-based Estanica Trading Ltd, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian crude oil.
The following companies are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy:

Sifra Shipping Company;
Vienna Shipping Co., Limited;
Riqueza Group Ltd;
Lilimoon Navigation Inc; and
Estanica Trading Ltd.
The following vessels are being identified as blocked property of the previously identified blocked persons:

SIFRA (Sifra Shipping Company);
G SILVER (Vienna Shipping Co., Limited);
QUANTUM HOPE (Riqueza Group Ltd);
VOYAGE ELITE (Lilimoon Navigation Inc); and
TELA (Estanica Trading Ltd).
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List. - Reuters, US Treasury

25/08/2026

Iran Threatens 45 Tankers with Fines, Confiscation in Hormuz Escalation

Iran said it had blacklisted 45 tankers that had broken its rules for crossing the Strait of Hormuz, and would take action against any vessels transferring loads with them, escalating its threats over the key waterway six months into the war. The named vessels could be ‌fined, detained and have their cargoes confiscated, according to an X post late on Sunday from the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, a new body set up by Iran to manage the strait.

The warning was issued within days of the U.S. threatening Iran with "the toughest sanctions in history", and Iran saying its response to any new U.S. threats would be "devastating". The restricted list includes very large crude carriers, liquefied natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas tankers, and clean ⁠product vessels, among others.

Some of the named ships are owned by the United Arab Emirates' ADNOC Logistics and Shipping (ADNOC L&S), ADNOC's subsidiary Navig8 Tankers, and Saudi Arabia's national shipping carrier Bahri. Any vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers with the named vessels could be added to the blacklist, the Iranian X post added.

The post did not spell out what it meant by Iran's rules, but Tehran has in the past said ship-owners should get its clearance to transit the strait and said ships should pay for security and other services.
The U.S. has also imposed a naval blockade against Iran-related shipping. The Persian Gulf supplied about 20% of the world's daily crude oil and liquefied natural gas before the Iran conflict disrupted tanker ‌traffic.

U.S.-coordinated ⁠efforts to shuttle tankers quietly through the Strait of Hormuz to fill supertankers waiting just outside it are helping restore some of those export volumes. U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said on X on Friday that the "7-day average of oil leaving the Strait is over 8 million barrels a day. Make no mistake, thanks to the U.S. Navy, oil is flowing through the Strait of ⁠Hormuz."

Ships owned by Klaveness Ship Management, Stolt Tankers and South Korea's Sinokor were also included on the blacklist. The shipping firms did not immediately respond to Reuters' requests for comment. The Persian Gulf Strait Authority has said cargo owners should refer to an updated list of ⁠vessels deemed non-compliant for voyages relating to the Persian Gulf. Ships seeking the removal of their names from the non-compliant vessels' list must submit a request with relevant explanations to Iran's maritime authorities, the post said. Below is the list of ⁠vessels appearing in the non-compliance list.

Vessel Name	IMO Number	Vessel Name	IMO Number	Vessel Name	IMO Number	Vessel Name	IMO Number	Vessel Name	IMO Number
Kik	9329796	Al Rawdah	9734513	Al Bahyah	9937799	Gaslog Shanghai	9600528	Kavomaleas	1042823
Mubaraz	9074626	Rasheeda	9443413	Mombasa B	9739501	Lubna	9489065	Mardan	9360453
Minoan Pioneer	9471630	Ryujin	8206818	Stolt Magnesium	9739317	Hazi 1	7802598	Sweden Prosperity	9588392
Hafeet	9928009	Lebrethah	9976927	Al Watan	9615030	Anna Barbara	9407500	Jarnain	9823546
Al Rekayyat	9397339	Lila Vadinar	9324100	Navig8 Messi	9482859	Sunbird Arrow	9323821	Kaifan	9656046
Wedyan	9524970	Maha Roos	9231004	Singapore Prosperity	9419967	Minoan Dignity	9294484	Nissos Kea	9920758
Cyprus Prosperity	9595216	Gfs Galaxy	9401271	Disha	9250713	Maria	9917828	Rotterdam Energy	9508859
Al Hamra	9074640	Umm Al Ashtan	9074652	Marigold Lng	9230062	Banastar	9228045	Navara	9241798
Nissos Heraclea	9419618	Blue Star 1	9215115	Ashley	9258466	Mraweh	9074638	Al Lulu	9583627

- Reuters

25/08/2026

Looming US Sanctions on Iran Put China Oil Buying in Spotlight

China has for several years been the biggest buyer of Iranian oil, putting its purchases in the spotlight as the U.S. threatens heavy economic sanctions on Tehran. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was scheduled to hold a press conference at 1 p.m. EDT (1700 GMT) on Monday. Following are key details on China's ‌oil trade with Iran, which last year averaged 1.4 million barrels per day, according to ship-tracking firm Kpler.

HOW MUCH OIL DOES CHINA CURRENTLY BUY FROM IRAN?
Less than it used to.The U.S. renewed its blockade of Iran's ships and ports on July 13 in an attempt to cut off oil sales as a deal to halt their war broke down, throttlingIranian exports.There have been no visible crossings of the Strait of Hormuz since then, according to ⁠Kpler data, although many vessels turn off their location transponders, making them difficult to track. Shipments fell to 785,000 barrels per day in June, the lowest since February 2023 and probably rose in July to 823,000 bpd, but the intake so far in August has dropped to 534,000 bpd, provisional Kpler data showed.

WHO ARE THE CHINESE BUYERS?
Chinese independent refiners have been the main Iranian crude buyers, attracted by what has typically been a steep discount to mainstream barrels. China's big state refiners have shunned Iranian oil since 2019, when the U.S. reimposed sanctions on Tehran, and China's official customs data does not show any purchases of Iranian crude. Iranian oil delivered to China has long been branded as Malaysian, and more recently Indonesian, ‌and is ⁠settled in Chinese currency, trading in a tight loop involving a chain of difficult-to-track intermediaries, refinery sources and traders involved in the business have said.

HAVE PREVIOUS U.S. SANCTIONS BEEN EFFECTIVE?
Washington has intensified its efforts to clamp down on Chinese purchases of Iranian oil since President Donald Trump returned to the White House early last year, imposing sanctions on mostly smaller Chinese refiners and other participants in the ⁠supply chain, which have in some cases proven disruptive. The U.S. Treasury Department has also warned two larger Chinese banks they could face secondary sanctions if Iranian funds were found moving through their systems, but has stopped short of designating them. In April, Washington imposed sanctions on Hengli ⁠Petrochemical (Dalian) refinery, along with about 40 shipping firms and vessels, accusing Hengli of buying billions of dollars worth of Iranian oil, escalating its efforts to curb Tehran's oil revenue. Hengli has denied buying Iranian oil. However, sanctions themselves have done ⁠little to slow overall flows of Iranian oil into China. China's Iranian oil imports stood at 1.24 million and 1.58 million bpd in January and February, respectively, Kpler data showed.

WHAT DOES CHINA SAY?
China, which has said it rejects unilateral sanctions, has called for a resolution through diplomatic and political means. - Reuters

25/08/2026

Libya Oil Firm Reports Well Maintaining & Drilling in 2026

The National Drilling and Well Maintenance Company has maintained 188 oil wells and drilled 21 others for the National Oil Corporation (NOC) subsidiaries this year, the NOC says.

The company has also established a drilling engineering department and expanded work on integrated drilling projects as part of efforts to develop its technical capacity.

The NOC said the company was facing mounting unpaid debts from clients, affecting its ability to buy spare parts and carry out maintenance and upgrades.

The company called on the NOC to help recover outstanding payments from operating companies.

The NOC stressed that greater priority should be given to the drilling and well-maintenance company in work commissioned by its subsidiaries, to help maintain its fleet and support production.

25/08/2026

Benefit Unveils Digital Direct Debit Service in Bahrain

Benefit has launched a Digital Direct Debit service to streamline credit assessment and automated loan repayments.

The new system allows banks, financing firms, and insurers to set up electronic recurring debit arrangements, reducing reliance on manual paper-based processes for collecting loan instalments and insurance premiums.

By integrating payment infrastructure with the Bahrain Credit Reference Bureau, the platform links credit scoring directly with automated collections, helping financial institutions lower operational costs and improve debt recovery rates.

“The growing interest in Digital Direct Debit among banks and financing companies reflects the market’s continued shift toward more seamless and digitally enabled lending journeys,” said Bahrain Credit Reference Bureau assistant general manager Latifa Al Mutawa.

Shafaq Al Kooheji, assistant general manager of payment services at Benefit, noted that the service extends beyond retail banking to the insurance sector, enabling automated premium collection under pre-authorised customer schedules.

25/08/2026

Capesize Dry Bulk Carriers Delivered to Oman's Asyad Shipping

As part of its ongoing fleet expansion strategy, Asyad Shipping Company on Tuesday announced the delivery of Ain Sahlnoot, the first of two second-hand baby-Capesize dry bulk carriers. The second vessel, Ain Hamran, is scheduled for delivery the following week.

Upon delivery, both vessels will be employed under three-year time-charter contracts with a leading international dry bulk freight operator, Asyad Shipping said in a disclosure to the Muscat Stock Exchange.

Dr Ibrahim Al Nadhairi, Chief Executive Officer of Asyad Shipping, said, “The addition of these two vessels puts our investment strategy into action. Their immediate deployment on three-year time-charter contracts will strengthen our dry bulk performance and provide clear commercial visibility. This disciplined approach to fleet growth supports sustainable long-term value for our stakeholders.”

As previously announced on May 21, 2026, Asyad Shipping signed agreements to purchase the two second-hand vessels for a total consideration of approximately RO29.2 million (~US$76 million).

Ain Sahlnoot was built in 2020 and Ain Hamran in 2021. Each vessel has a capacity of 100,309 deadweight tonnes, the company said.

In April, Asyad Shipping took delivery of three Newcastlemax dry bulk carriers as part of its fleet expansion strategy. The vessels – Ain Garziz, Ain Razat and Ain Athum – were secured on long-term charter contracts, providing immediate revenue visibility.

With its strategic geographical location and one of the largest globally diversified fleets, comprising approximately 90 vessels, Asyad Shipping serves more than 60 countries and is well positioned to supply high-growth markets, particularly in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.

25/08/2026

Libyan Finance Minister Reviews Economic Reforms with US Adviser

Finance Minister Rashed Abughaffa has met US State Department senior adviser for Libyan political affairs Jeremy Brendt to discuss economic issues and unified development spending.

The meeting in Tripoli covered Libya’s financial position and government spending, as well as the ministry’s strategy for reforming public finances, according to the Finance Ministry. Abughaffa also outlined efforts to support the oil sector, saying they were aimed at increasing state revenues and strengthening public finances.

25/08/2026

United States Sanctions Oil Trader Wellbred over Iran Links

The United States imposed sanctions on Singapore-based Wellbred Capital and its trading firms in the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland, citing links with Iran, as ‌it steps up measures to target Tehran's global financial links. The company had ties to Iranian oil shipping magnate Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control said on its website on Monday.

"Shamkhani built Wellbred as a company outside ⁠the network’s Iranian business, though Shamkhani is ultimately responsible for Wellbred’s operations," it added in a statement outlining the measures targeting nearly 60 companies, individuals and ships. Wellbred did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Also sanctioned were Dubai-based Wellbred Trading FZCO, Wellbred Trading SA in Geneva and its French biofuels refinery La Nivernaise de Raffinage SAS. With headquarters in Singapore, Wellbred trades in ‌oil, ⁠naphtha, petrochemicals and liquefied petroleum gas and has offices in the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, it says on its website.

OFAC had previously designated individuals, entities and vessels forming part of a ⁠vast shipping empire controlled by Shamkhani in July 2025 and April 2026. Shamkhani, the son of now-deceased senior Iranian security official Ali Shamkhani, operates a ⁠massive fleet of tankers and containerships, OFAC had said. The network ferries oil and petroleum products from Iran and Russia, as ⁠well as other cargo, to buyers around the world, generating profits running into tens of billions of dollars, OFAC added. - Reuters

25/08/2026