US Hits Remaining Parts of Iran’s Aviation Sector with Sanctions

The Trump administration on Tuesday imposed sanctions on additional elements of Iran’s aviation industry, targeting more than two dozen commercial and private airlines as well as foreign cargo service providers in its new push to isolate Tehran from its remaining trading partners.

The latest actions are part of the Trump administration’s Operation Economic Outcast campaign that is aimed at severing “critical financial lifelines” for the already heavily sanctioned Iranian government. Hours later, the U.S. military struck multiple Iranian tankers in response to more attempted missile attacks on a Navy warship, according to a U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive military operations.

It is all part of a two-pronged economic and military approach by President Donald Trump as he struggles to bring an end to a more than six-month-old war with Tehran.

The new penalties target the remaining facets of Tehran’s already beleaguered aviation ecosystem, which has been under layered U.S., United Nations and European restrictions and sanctions dating back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

“Let this be a warning to anyone doing business with Iran’s remaining airlines, all of which we sanctioned today: You are at risk of being cut off from the global financial system,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a press release.

The Trump administration accused the 36 entities targeted this week of supporting the Islamic Republic’s efforts to use its aviation sector to move weapons, personnel, and illicit cargo. The moves will subject foreign firms and governments that do business with the targeted entities to sanctions themselves, including a freeze on any assets they may have in U.S. jurisdictions.

In a post on X, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called out the longstanding U.S. sanctions campaign against Iran, saying that the fallout “has been disastrous for America, including its standing worldwide.”

“After failing to achieve its aims through sanctions or war, Washington’s “novel” solution is…more sanctions. Seriously?” Araghchi wrote Tuesday afternoon.

The administration also claimed that private entities based in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan and Malaysia have provided parts and logistics services to Iran’s Mahan Air. The major airline, which flies from Tehran to a few dozen destinations in Asia, Europe and the Middle East, has been subject to U.S. counterterrorism sanctions since 2019 for its support for Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard, which the State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization.

The airline was first targeted by the U.S. under the Obama administration in 2011, when it accused Mahan Air of being used to send weapons to Lebanon and Yemen. But analysts describe Tuesday’s actions as the most comprehensive U.S. attempt to completely halt the country’s civil aviation sector and could eventually become a devastating aerial blockade.

“Before, it was the targeting of specific companies and individuals; now it’s just a blanket sanction on the entire aviation sector,” Farzin Nadimi, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies, said. “I think it will definitely be the most effective campaign and could result in the cessation of international flights into Iran.”

But Nadimi also warned that if the Treasury operation is not coupled with a public relations campaign to warn the Iranian people from using these airlines, it could risk dangerous or even deadly incidents. Most of Iran’s remaining commercial aircraft are decades old and have not received proper upgrades or inspections due to sanctions.

Last week, the U.S. announced penalties against Golden Global Yatirim Bankasi Anonim Sirketi, a Turkish bank, which it accused of being established to enable Iran’s efforts to transfer oil revenues from China to Turkey, where they could then be converted to cash and gold.

The U.S. also said the institution “knowingly offered” banking services to Iranian financial entities, including those already sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2022 for funneling Tehran’s oil sales.

An Egyptian bank’s operations in the United Arab Emirates were also limited last month as part of the campaign, but the administration stopped short of imposing sanctions as it grapples with how to sever Iran’s economic footprint without upending the global financial system.

IRANIAN AIRLINES
Iran’s commercial airlines have long supported the Iranian regime’s destabilizing activities, with the IRGC using ostensibly private airlines, such as Mahan Air, for the procurement and transport of weapons and the ferrying of personnel.  On August 24, 2026, Economic D-Day, Treasury issued determinations against critical sectors––including aviation––that the Iranian regime uses to try to prop up its failing economy.  Today, OFAC is announcing its inaugural designations of Iranian airlines pursuant to this determination.  

OFAC is designating the following 27 Iranian airlines pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the aviation sector of the Iranian economy:

Air Shiraz
Asa Jet Airline
Ata Airlines Company
Atlas Aviation Group
Ava Airlines
Chabahar Airlines Company
Erwan Airline Company
Fly Kish Airlines
Fly Persia Airlines
Iran Air Tour
Iran Aseman Airlines
Jsky Airlines
Kish Airlines
Karun Airlines Company
Lad Airways
Mehr Airways
Nasim Air
Pars Oghyanous Kish Company
Qeshm Air
Raimon Airways
Saha Airlines
Sepehran Airlines
Soroush Air
Taban Airlines
Toos Airlines
Varesh Airlines
Zagros Airlines
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
As identified in past OFAC advisories, Iran has long engaged in deceptive practices with respect to aviation, to include the use of front companies and other pass-through entities in third countries to obfuscate the ultimate Iranian end-user of U.S.-origin aircraft and aviation-related materials.  The civil aviation industry should be alert to deceptive practices used by some Iranian persons, designated airlines, and their agents or affiliates to acquire U.S.-origin aircraft or related goods, technology, or services subject to U.S. jurisdiction in violation of U.S. sanctions.

Today’s FinCEN Alert underscores these risks for financial institutions, as well, highlighting several key red flag indicators to help them detect, prevent, and report potentially suspicious activity involving Iran’s efforts to procure aircraft and aircraft parts.

In summer 2026, Mahan Air received at least three B-777 aircraft that were diverted through the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman.  UAE-based ECT Aviation Support LLC (ECT Aviation Support UAE) and Türkiye-based Sky Phoenix Hava Yollari Tasimaciligi Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Sky Phoenix) served as intermediaries in the scheme to transfer U.S.‑origin aircraft to Mahan Air.  Each aircraft originated from a retired fleet before passing through ECT Aviation Support UAE, where they received temporary registrations.  The transfer route closely mirrored previous sanctions evasion operations for Mahan Air.

UAE-based Egyptian national Ibrahim Ali Mohamed Mohamed Mahran (Mahran) is the chief executive officer, managing director, founder, and owner of ECT Aviation Support UAE.  United Kingdom (UK)-based ECT Aviation Support LTD (ECT Aviation Support UK) is wholly owned by ECT Aviation Support UAE, which is owned by Mahran.  Mahran is also the director of ECT Aviation Support UK and has served as its director since the company’s establishment.

UAE-based Aerobravo Airplane Management and Operation LLC (Aerobravo Airplane Management) has acted as the operator for aircraft owned by ECT Aviation Support UAE.

ECT Aviation Support UAE and Sky Phoenix are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mahan Air.  Mahran is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being a leader or official of ECT Aviation Support UAE.  ECT Aviation Support UK is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mahran.  Aerobravo Airplane Management is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, ECT Aviation Support UAE.

CARGO SERVICES PROVIDERS AND GENERAL SALES AGENTS
Lastly, OFAC is taking action against cargo service providers and general sales agents that have serviced Mahan Air’s international flights.  General sales agents provide a range of services to airlines, including sales and customer support services and coordination with freight forwarders and shippers on the airline’s behalf.

Türkiye-based S Sistem Lojistik Hizmetler Anonim Sirketi (S Sistem) has coordinated shipments, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components and industrial equipment destined for Iran, on behalf of Mahan Air.  Türkiye-based Mes Cargo Transportation Tourism and Foreign Trade Limited Company (Mes Cargo) is serving as a general sales agent for Mahan Air and has coordinated shipments on behalf of Mahan Air.

Malaysia-based Icargo SDN BHD (Icargo) has served as a general sales agent for Mahan Air and has coordinated the shipment of U.S.-origin parts to Iran on Mahan Air’s behalf.  Kazakhstan-based Tour Invest LLC (Tour Invest) has served as a general sales agent for Mahan Air.

S Sistem, Mes Cargo, Icargo, and Tour Invest are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mahan Air.

FINCEN’S ALERT TO COUNTER IRANIAN PROCUREMENT EFFORTS FOR ITS COMMERCIAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
FinCEN’s Alert to Counter Iranian Procurement Efforts for its Commercial Aviation Industry contains red flags and typologies to help financial institutions detect, prevent, and report suspicious activity potentially involving Iran’s procurement of aircraft and aircraft parts, including when Iran’s direct involvement is not readily identifiable in transaction details.  Iran employs deceptive schemes to illicitly procure U.S.- and Western-origin aircraft and aircraft parts.  Iranian airlines procure aircraft, as well as needed parts and services, using front companies in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.  Front companies posing as technology, aviation, or logistics companies in third-country jurisdictions will also often purchase aircraft components and related dual-use items from the United States or other Western countries for subsequent export to Iran.  FinCEN encourages U.S. financial institutions to remain vigilant for suspicious activity that may be connected to Iranian aviation sector procurement networks and to report it immediately to FinCEN.

FinCEN’s alert is available at FinCEN.gov.

For questions on this Alert, please contact FinCEN at http://www.fincen.gov/contact.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis.  OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions.  Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding US$1,000,000.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions.  OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List. - AP, US Treasury